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Notes
The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense
for Political Protesters
by
FRANK LAWRENCE*
Peace activists in the United States have advocated an end to war
for many years. These efforts occasionally have involved the commission
of acts of civil disobedience,' for which individuals frequently are ar-
rested on charges of trespass, disorderly conduct, or similar misdemean-
ors.2 Beginning with the Korean War, and continuing through the
Vietnam War, the nuclear arms race and the present war in Central
America, several defendants in these political protest cases have sought
to raise the Nuremberg Principles as a defense.3
The Allied powers codified the Nuremberg Principles as interna-
tional law at the end of World War II.4 The Principles define three types
* B.A. 1985, University of California, Santa Cruz; Member, Third Year Class.
The Author would like to acknowledge Ann Fagan Ginger, President of the Meiklejohn
Civil Liberties Institute, for her invaluable contribution to this Note.
1. See generally Bauer & Eckerstrom, The State Made Me Do It: The Applicability of the
Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1174, 1175 n.14 (1987) ("Philoso-
phers have long debated the definition, and thus the limits, of civil disobedience. Their defini-
tions range from the general to the specific. John Rawls defines civil disobedience as 'a public,
nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bring-
ing about a change in the law or policies of the government.' . . . Howard Zinn defines it as
'the deliberate, discriminate, violation of law for a vital social purpose.'" (citations omitted));
Levitin, Putting the Government on Trial. The Necessity Defense and Social Change, 33
WAYNE L. REv. 1221, 1225 n.15 (1987) (Civil disobedience "is usually defined as peaceful,
noncompliance with laws believed to be unjust in an effort to change them.").
2. See United States v. Montgomery, 722 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F.
Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968). See infra notes 202-62 for additional cases raising the Nuremberg
defense.
3. For present purposes, the "Nuremberg Principles" are defined as enumerated in arti-
cle VI of the London Charter. See infra note 16.
4. See Kaufman, Judgment at Nurnberg-An Appraisal of its Significance, 40 GUILD
PRAc. 62 (1983) [hereinafter Appraisal]; Kaufman, Statements, Declarations and Agreements
Leading to the War Crimes Trials at Nurnberg, Germany and Relevant Documents, 40 GUILD
PRAC. 84 (1983) [hereinafter Agreements].
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of international crimes: crimes against the peace; crimes against human-
ity; and war crimes. 5 The Principles hold perpetrators of these interna-
tional crimes6 individually responsible for their acts, 7 and were applied in
the trials of Nazi civilian, government, and military leaders at Nurem-
berg, Germany after World War 11.8
In the decades since World War II, peace activists in the United
States have sought to use the Nuremberg Principles as a defense. For
example, the Nuremberg defense could be raised in the following scena-
rio: Suppose a group of people are arrested while protesting weapon pro-
duction by a defense contractor, and are charged with disorderly
conduct. The defendants targeted this particular factory because it pro-
duces a rapid-fire air-to-ground-cannon that the United States govern-
ment supplies to the government of El Salvador. The defendants believe
this weapon is used against civilians in El Salvador in violation of the
Nuremberg Principles, and that the defense contractor and the United
States government are therefore aiding and abetting this crime.
In their defense, the protesters rely on a state statutory privilege to
prevent crimes, which is found in a majority of state criminal codes. 9 A
typical statute provides that a citizen, who reasonably believes that a fel-
ony or a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace is being com-
mitted or is about to be committed in his or her presence, may use
reasonable force to terminate or prevent such crime.10 The problem with
using the privilege in this context is that the crime the defendants seek to
prevent is not found in the state criminal codes. Rather, it is a violation
of the Nuremberg Principles. Therefore, the defendants must present ev-
idence to the fact-finder regarding the meaning and application of the
Nuremberg Principles in order to complete their defense.l" If the court
allows the defense, it is not required to rule on the legality of United
States foreign policy in El Salvador. The issue is limited to the reasona-
bleness of the defendants' beliefs that they were acting under legal au-
thority when they violated the disorderly conduct laws. Additionally,
5. See infra note 16, at art. VI.
6. In this Note, the phrase "international crimes" means crimes against the peace,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes as defined by the Nuremberg Principles.
7. See infra section I(A).
8. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).
9. The great majority of modern codes treat crime prevention in two other privilege
statutes: self-defense or defense of others, and defense of property. See W. LAFAVE & A.
ScOTr JR., CRIMINAL LAW 474 n.33 (1986) [hereinafter LAFAVE]. There is a trend among
states to add the privilege to criminal codes. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1111
(3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter PERKINS].
10. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 474-75; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 693, 694 (West
1988).
11. The case described is Vermont v. McCann, No. 2857-7-86 (D. Vt. Jan. 26, 1987),
reprinted in 44 GUILD PRAC. 101 (1987). For a discussion of Vermont v. McCann, see infra
notes 202-213 and accompanying text.
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allowing the defense is not synonymous with acquitting the defendants;
the question is simply whether the defendants will be allowed to present
evidence concerning the Nuremberg Principles to the jury, and whether
the court will instruct the jury on the Nuremberg Defense.
Until recently, domestic courts12 have not allowed criminal defend-
ants to present evidence to juries concerning the Nuremberg Principles. 13
This refusal is open to serious challenge from both legal and policy per-
spectives. A minority of courts have recognized the validity of this chal-
lenge and have permitted defenses involving the Nuremberg
Principles. 14
In Section I, this Note begins with a brief history of the Nuremberg
Principles: the circumstances under which they were promulgated, their
contents, and how they apply to the United States, its courts, and its
citizens. Section II describes the two formulations of the modem Nu-
remberg Defense-the Citizen's Privilege and the Citizen's Duty. Sec-
tion III then examines the merits and flaws in the reasoning employed by
domestic courts denying criminal defendants the right to present evi-
dence relating to the Nuremberg Principles, and concludes that criminal
defendants should be permitted to utilize the defense. Section IV sum-
marizes several recent cases allowing the Nuremberg Defense, and argues
that the decisions by courts permitting the Defense represent a more ra-
tional and legally sound approach. The Note concludes that allowing the
defense is essential to protect the citizens' interests in acting to prevent
international transgressions and the criminal defendant's constitutional
rights, while also ensuring that the defendant's behavior does not exceed
the tolerance of the local community.
I. The Nuremberg Principles and International Law
On August 8, 1946, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and
Great Britain 15 signed an Agreement for the Establishment of an Inter-
national Military Tribunal 16 to try persons charged with crimes under a
12. The phrases "domestic courts" and "United States courts" refer to all federal and
state courts within the United States.
13. See, e.g., Komarow, Individual Responsibility Under International Law: the Nurem-
berg Principles In Domestic Legal Systems, 29 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 21, 30 (1980) ("A review of
the U.S. cases indicates that construing U.S. legislation in conformity with the Nuremberg
Principles has always meant finding a theory under which the domestic law could prevail.");
Snee, The Nuremberg Principles of Individual Responsibility as Applied in United States Courts,
25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 891, 913 (1982) ("[C]ourts soundly reject the [Nuremberg] defense if it
involves alleged crimes against the peace or humanity.").
14. See infra notes 202-62 and accompanying text.
15. Expressing their adherence to the agreement were Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the
Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Pan-
ama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Paraguay. See
Komarow, supra note 13, at 23.
16. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of European
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charter annexed to the Agreement. 17 These documents are collectively
known as the London Agreement and Charter. The London Charter
summarized the laws of war in its definitions of crimes against the peace,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 18 Specifically, article VI of the
London Charter provided a non-inclusive list of international crimes for
which individuals would be held personally responsible, including the
following definition of crimes against the peace: "planning, preparation,
initiation of waging of a war in violation of international treaties, agree-
ments or assurances." 19 The London Charter codified what would be-
come a central theme of the Nuremberg Trials: a defendant's official
position, whether as a head of State or a responsible government official,
does not exonerate him or her from personal responsibility for violations
of international law.20 The London Charter also rejected the notion that
an individual should not be responsible for actions taken under superior
orders. 2'
At the signing of the London Agreement and Charter, United States
Supreme Court Justice Robert K. Jackson, who served as chief American
prosecutor at Nuremberg, noted that "for the first time four of the most
powerful nations have agreed... upon the principle of individual respon-
sibility for the crime of attacking international peace."'22 This principle
of individual responsibility was enforced in the war crimes trials at Nu-
Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S.
No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter].
17. The Nuremberg Principles have many historical antecedents. For an excellent review
of the Principles' origin by a prosecutor at Nuremberg, see Appraisal, supra note 4.
18. London Charter, supra note 16, at art. VI (a), (b), (c), 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at
288; see Agreements, supra note 4, at 86-88.
19. London Charter, supra note 16, art. VI, 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
Article VI defines war crimes as:
[M]urder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose the
civilian population of or in an occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners
of war or persons on the scene, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private prop-
erty, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity.
Id. (at 287-88).
Crimes against humanity are defined as:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during war; or persecutions on polit-
ical, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated ....
Id.
20. Id. at art. VII, 59 Stat. at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288.
21. Id. at art. VIII, 59 Stat. at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S at 288.
22. Jackson, Statement of Chief U.S. Counsel Upon Signing of the Agreement, 19 TEMP.
L.Q. 169, 169 (1946).
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remberg 23 and the Pacific theater war crimes trials in Tokyo.24
In December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly unani-
mously adopted a resolution that afi ed "the principles of international
law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judg-
ment of the Tribunal. '25
A. Individual Responsibility
President Franklin D. Roosevelt emphasized the importance of indi-
vidual responsibility in a 1944 speech on Nazi war crimes:
I ask every German and every man everywhere under Nazi domi-
nation to show the world by his action that in his heart he does not
share [Hitler's] insane criminal desires. Let him hide these pursued
victims, help them to get over their borders, and do what he can to
save them from the Nazi hangman. I ask him also to keep watch, and
to record the evidence that will one day be used to convict the guilty. 26
23. See Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgment and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 221 (1947).
24. Tokyo War Crimes Trial, reprinted in 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY 1029 (L. Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter THE LAW OF WAR].
25. G.A. Res. 95 (I), 188 U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946). In November, 1947, the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the International Law Commission of the
United Nations to write a "draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind,"
based upon the Nuremberg Principles. G.A. Res. 177 (II), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at
11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950); The Commission completed the Draft Code in 1951. Draft Code
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1950] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 249
U.N. Doc A/CN y/19/Add. 1, 2; Report of the International Law Commission Covering its
Third Session, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 103, 123 (Supp. 1951).
The General Assembly has yet to vote on the Code. For many years, the main point of
contention was finding an acceptable definition of "international aggression," upon which the
Code relies heavily. See Komarow, supra note 13, at 25. In 1974, however, the United Na-
tions agreed on a definition of aggression. See Garvey, United Nations Definition ofAggression,
17 VA. J. INT'L L. 177, 177-81 (1977). In 1978 the Code was circulated to member nations for
comments and suggestions. Thus, the Code may soon be ratified by the General Assembly.
See Snee, supra note 13, at 894-95.
For a discussion of the proposed Draft Code, see Lippert, The Codification of the Nurem-
berg Principles, 28 L.A. BULL. 157 (1953).
26. Statement by President Roosevelt on German War Crimes, 1944, reprinted in CRIMES
OF WAR 77 (R. Falk, G. Kolko & R.J. Lifton, eds. 1971). The following preceded the quoted
portion of Roosevelt's speech:
The United Nations are fighting to make a world in which tyranny and aggression
cannot exist; a world based upon freedom, equality and justice; a world in which all
persons regardless of race, color or creed may live in peace, honor and dignity...
[Miost of Europe and in parts of Asia the systematic torture and murder of civil-
ians-men, women and children-by the Nazis and the Japanese continues unabated
[ ie should again proclaim our determination that none who participate in these
acts of savagery shall go unpunished. The United Nations have made it clear that
they will pursue the guilty and deliver them up in order that Justice be done. That
warning applies not only to the leaders but also to their functionaries and subordi-
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Roosevelt's concern was not new. Individuals have been held re-
sponsible for their acts under international law for centuries. Punish-
ment for the crime of piracy, for example, has been directed not "against
the State whose subject or whose vessel had been responsible for acts of
piracy [but instead] against the master and crew of the pirate ship as
outlaws of the family of nations. ' 27 Individuals also have been held per-
sonally responsible for such international crimes as espionage, sabotage,
running blockades, and transporting contraband. 28 In addition, individ-
ual responsibility has been imposed under international treaties gov-
erning the slave trade, freedom of the seas, and war and peace. 29
The United States Supreme Court specifically has recognized indi-
vidual responsibility for international crimes. For example, in Ex Parte
Quirin,30 the Court allowed Nazi spies to be prosecuted in the United
States for violation of the 1907 Hague Convention. 31 In the Court's
view, the issue of individual responsibility was resolved by the fact that
the defendants had chosen to violate international law. 32
The Nuremberg Principles codified this long-standing concept of in-
dividual responsibility for international crimes. 33 While the concept of
individual responsibility predated World War II, the war crimes trials
greatly expanded the enforcement of this principle. 34  For example, in
United States v. Von Leeb, the American Military Tribunal stated:
International law operates as a restriction and limitation on the
sovereignty of nations. It may also limit the obligations which individ-
nates in Germany and in the satellite countries .... All who share the guilt shall
share the punishment ....
Id.
27. A. DEL Russo, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 53 (1971).
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id. at 55.
30. 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942).
31. Hague Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. The Hague Conven-
tion of 1907 is an international treaty governing the laws and customs of war. The 1907 Hague
Convention, of which the United States is a signatory, stated that it is important "to revise the
laws and general customs of war," so as to create "certain limits for the purpose of modifying
their severity as far as possible." Id. The parties declared that "populations and belligerents
remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result
from the usages established between civilized nations, and from the laws of humanity, and the
requirements of the public conscience." Id. According to one scholar of international law,
this rule "makes the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience obligatory by
themselves, without the formulation of a treaty specifically prohibiting" the particular objec-
tionable behavior. Meyrowitz, Nuclear Weapons Policy: The Ultimate Tyranny, 7 NOVA L.J.
93, 97 (1982).
32. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35-38, 45-46; see Campbell, The Nuremberg Defense to Charges of
Domestic Crime: A Non-Traditional Approach for Nuclear-Arms Protesters, 16 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 94, 96 (1986) (arguing that international law provides a reasonable basis for believing that
nuclear weapons are illegal and explaining the citizen's privilege formulation of the defense).
33. See supra note 19.
34. See The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 109-11 (1946).
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uals owe to their states, and creates for them international obligations
which are binding upon them to an extent that they must be carried
out even if to do so violates a positive law or directive of state.35
The American Tribunal in Von Leeb also held that complicity in the
commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against
humanity is itself a crime under international law.36
In, The Nurnberg Trial, the International Military Tribunal stated:
"[T]he very essence of the [London] Charter is that individuals have in-
ternational duties which transcend national obligations of obedience im-
posed by the individual state."' 37 The International Tribunal emphasized
that "crimes against international law are committed by men, not by ab-
stract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."' 38 The Inter-
national Tribunal concluded that the true test of an individual's culpabil-
ity for an international crime is "whether moral choice was in fact
possible."'39
After the Nuremberg trials, a similar process took place in the Asian
theater at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial.4° The Tokyo War Crimes Tribu-
nal expanded the concept of personal responsibility, stating: "[A]nyone
with knowledge of illegal activity and an opportunity to do something
about it is a potential criminal under international law unless the person
takes affirmative measures to prevent the commission of the crimes."'41
Taken literally, this is a broad declaration of individual responsibility for
international crimes. The statement is dicta and, depending on how one
interprets "opportunity," can be read to exclude the moral choice ele-
ment of individual responsibility under the Nuremberg Principles. Nev-
ertheless, the statement is evidence of how expansively individual
responsibility may be interpreted, and indeed was interpreted, after
World War II.
The principle that international law creates individual legal culpabil-
ity also is found in the United States Army Field Manual. 42 The Manual,
prepared by the United States Army to inform its personnel of applicable
international law,43 states that "[t]he law of war is binding not only upon
35. United States v. Von Leeb, reported in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 462, 489
(1950).
36. Id. at 469-72.
37. Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 110.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 111.
40. THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 24, at 1029-1183.
41. Id. at 1283.
42. DEP'T OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD MANUAL, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE (1956).
43. Id. at 3. The Manual states that its purpose is "to provide authoritative guidance to
military personnel on the customary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on
land and to relationships between belligerents and neutral States." Id.
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States as such but also upon individuals .... ."44 This express executive
endorsement of individual responsibility is further evidence of the con-
cept's vitality.
The notion of individual responsibility, which forms the core of the
Nuremberg Principles, applies not only to government officials, policy
makers, and military personnel, but to private citizens as well. 45 The
basis for such responsibility depends "on the extent of complicity as re-
flected in actions and knowledge. ' 46 As the Tribunal noted when con-
fronted with the question of civilian responsibility for international
crimes committed during World War II:
Acts adjudged criminal when done by an officer of the government are
criminal when done by a private individual. The guilt differs only in
magnitude, not in quality. The offender, in either case is charged with
personal wrong, and punishment falls upon the offender in propria per-
sona. The application of international law to individuals is no
novelty.47
Having discussed the origin of the Nuremberg Principles and re-
viewed their core concept-individual responsibility-this Note now ex-
amines the basis for domestic judicial application of those principles.
B. Application of the Nuremberg Principles in United States Courts
In order to use the Nuremberg Principles as a defense in domestic
courts, criminal defendants must establish that the Principles are a part
of the law that those courts have a duty to apply.48 The Nuremberg
44. Id. at 4.
45. The Zyklon B Case, reprinted in THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 24, at 1487, in which
civilians were charged with providing Zykion B (prussic acid) used to exterminate prisoners in
concentration camps, also dealt with the question of civilian liability for complicity with inter-
national crimes:
[T]he provisions of the laws and customs of war are addressed not only to combat-
ants and to members of state and other public authorities, but to anybody who is in a
position to assist their violation.
The activities with which the accused in the present case were charged were commer-
cial transactions conducted by civilians. The military court acted on the principle
that any civilian who is an accessory to a violation of the laws and customs of war is
himself also liable as a war criminal.
Id.
46. Falk, The Nuremberg Defense in the Pentagon Papers Case, 13 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 208, 231 (1974).
47. The Flick Case, 6 F.R.D. 66 (1948), reprinted in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
(1952).
48. In an interesting case, Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam), the
Supreme Court implied that judgments of international tribunals are not stare decisis in United
States courts. Thus, the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg argua-
bly is not binding precedent on domestic courts. Hirota involved several Japanese generals
who, having been convicted of war crimes by an international military tribunal, appealed to
the Supreme Court for leave to file a writ of habeas corpus. Explaining its refusal of the
appeal, the Court noted that the "tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the
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Principles should apply in domestic legal proceedings for three reasons:
(1) the Principles are an executive agreement and thus constitute a part
of federal law; (2) the Principles are customary international law, thereby
forming a part of domestic law; and (3) the United States government
intended to be bound by the Nuremburg Principles when they were
promulgated.
(1) Nuremburg Principles Are an Executive Agreement
Executive Agreements are international agreements entered into by
the executive branch without the Senate ratification required by the Con-
stitution for treaties. 49 The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of executive agreements on three occasions.50 In both
United States v. Pink and United States v. Belmont the Court held that
executive agreements are federal law and therefore override state law
under the supremacy clause.51
As an executive agreement,52 the London Agreement and Charter is
part of the supreme law of the land. Domestic courts, therefore, are
bound to apply the London Agreement and Charter, and its definition of
the Nuremberg Principles, when relevant.
United States.... Under the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no
power or authority to review, to affirm set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed
on these petitioners." Id at 198.
49. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrTIONAL LAW 226 (2d ed. 1988); HENKIN, FoR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrrTION 176-80 (1972); Rovine, Separation of Powers and In-
ternational Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397, 410-11 (1977). U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2 requires senate ratification of treaties.
50. Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 674-88 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
51. Pink 315 U.S. at 221-26; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This clause provides:
This constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
52. Since Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson signed the agreement as a represen-
tative of the United States government, the London Agreement and Charter fits precisely the
definition of executive agreements. See Jackson, supra note 22; supra text accompanying note
49, The Agreement and Charter are reported in the Executive Agreement Series and in part 2
of Volume 59 of United States Statutes at Large, which is titled "Private Laws, Concurrent
Resolutions, Proclamations, Treaties, International Agreements Other Than Treaties." (Em-
phasis added). See supra note 16.
Whether the London Agreement and Charter has the status of a treaty apparently is
undecided. In United States v. Mitchell, 386 U.S. 972, 973 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
Justice Douglas dissented from a denial of certiorari, asserting: "This case presents the ques-
tion [of] ... whether the [London Agreement and Charter] is a treaty within the meaning of
Art. VI, cl. 2 ...."
January 1989]
(2) Nuremberg Principles Are Part of Customary International Law
The second argument for applying the Principles in domestic courts
is that they have become part of customary international law. In addi-
tion to executive agreements and treaties, 53 the Supreme Court, for over
two centuries, has recognized customary international law as "the Law
of the Land."' 54 Acknowledging the importance of this body of law, the
Court has stated that customary international law "is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of ap-
propriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination. '55
The Statute of the International Court of Justice, 56 which is an inte-
gral part of the United Nations Charter, provides that sources of custom-
ary international law include: "(a) international conventions .. . ; (b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
... ; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations . . . -57 Applying these principles, fed-
53. In addition to executive agreements, two other types of international law form a part
of United States domestic law: treaties and customary international law. Formal treaties, to
which the United States is a signatory are ratified by the Senate. The Supremacy Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution makes treaties the supreme law of the
land:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding."
54. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 n.34 (1964) (recog-
nizing the court's authority to consider questions of international law); Ex Parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 36-39 (1942) (applying internationally recognized "law of war"); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 667, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction..."); The Antelope, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 66, 120-22 (1825) ("the law of nations ... which has received the assent of all
must be the law of all .. "); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 277 (1808) ("the law of
nations is the law of all tribunals ...."); Respublica v. DeLongschamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111
(1784) ("the law of nations .... in its fullest extent, is a part of the law of this state").
55. Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. The Paquete Habana was one of two Spanish
fishing vessels seized off the Cuban coast by the United States Navy as war prizes during the
Spanish-American War. Id. at 677-78. The Supreme Court noted that the seizure was an
official act by the United States Navy during wartime, yet nevertheless held that the action
violated principles of customary international law, and ordered the ships returned. Id. at 714.
Thus the Court made clear that governmental actions, even military acts during wartime, are
reviewable in the courts and that the federal government should and will be held accountable
for such acts under the rules of international law.
56. U.N. CHARTER, art. 38(1).
Both the United Nations Charter and the Statute were ratified by the United States Senate
as a treaty. Hence, the Statute receives the full benefits and protection of the Supremacy
Clause.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 38, 1.
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eral courts have, in recent human rights decisions, recognized the follow-
ing as sources of customary international law: Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; 58 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Be-
ing Subjected to Torture;59 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;60 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights;61 the American Convention on Human
Rights;62 and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners. 63 While these documents lack the binding force
of treaties, federal courts have recognized that an instrument that "cre-
ates an expectation of adherence, and insofar as the expectation is gradu-
ally justified by State practice, ... may by custom become recognized as
laying down rules binding upon the States."' 4 In other cases, individual
Supreme Court Justices have relied on the United Nations Charter and
General Assembly Resolutions as evidence of "standards of decency." '65
Additionally, the force of customary international law has been rec-
ognized in the United States Army Field Manual, which states:
The unwritten or customary law of war is binding upon all nations....
The customary law of war is part of the law of the United States, and,
insofar as it is not inconsistent with any treaty to which this country is
a party or with a controlling executive or legislative act, is binding
upon the United States, citizens of the United States, and other persons
serving this country.66
In summary, customary international law is not foreign law, rather
it is a part of United States constitutional and federal law. When princi-
58. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/180, at 71 (1948); see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (the court found a binding international prohibition
against torture.); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980) (the princi-
ples of customary international law could be drawn from "an overview of express international
conventions."), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1981).
59. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975); see
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882-83.
60. 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950); see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884; Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at
797.
61. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 56, U.N Doc. A/6316
(1966); see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884; Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 797.
62. O.A.S.T.S. No. 36; Official Records, O.E.A./Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr.
1, (1970); see Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883-84; Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795, 797.
63. E.S.C. Res. 663C, 9 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 7) at 283, U.N. Doc. E/1463 (1957);
E.S.C. Res. 2076, 6 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 19, U.N. Doc. E/2372 (1977); see Lareau
v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part, 651 F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 1981).
In Lareau, the court stated that the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners are part of the "body of international law concerning human rights which
has been built upon the foundation of the United Nations Charter." Id. at 1183.
64. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883.
65. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 673
(Murphy, J., concurring); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 n.8 (1976); see Rudolph v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889-90 & n.1 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
66. UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 42, at 7.
January 1989] THE NUREMBURG DEFENSE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
pies of international law are relevant to a case, courts must give them the
same effect as they give to other principles of law. Since executive agree-
ments and customary international law are part of federal law, they take
precedence over state law. 67
Given the widespread support for the Nuremberg Principles, 68 their
unanimous adoption by resolution of the United Nations, 69 and their in-
corporation by statute into the law of several nations, 70 there is a very
strong argument that they are part of customary international law. Be-
cause of the leading role the United States played in drafting and enforc-
ing the Nuremberg Principles, 71 it is hypocritical for the United States
courts to assert that the Principles do not constitute binding international
obligations, or that the Principles may not or should not have application
in domestic courts. Indeed, Mary Kaufman, a prosecutor at the United
States War Crimes Trial of L G. Farben72 at Nuremberg, believes that
"the principles codified in the charter and established by the [Interna-
tional Military Tribunal's] judgment were so widely affirmed that their
source as a statement of international law is not open to question. 73
At least one commentator has contended, however, that the Nurem-
berg Principles are not part of customary international law. 74 First, it
has been argued that "more than a single event is necessary for a pro-
posed principle to be considered part of customary [international] law."'75
The Nuremberg Principles are characterized as having their origins and
application exclusively in the context of World War II, which, in turn, is
seen as a "single event."'76
This view of the Nuremberg Principles is excessively narrow, and
ignores both the Principles' substantial historical foundation and interna-
tional reliance on the principles in the wake of World War II. The 1868
Declaration of St. Petersburg stated that "the progress of civilization
should have the effect of alleviating, as much as possible, the calamities
of war."' 77 This concept was a precursor to the London Agreement and
Charter's prohibition against the plunder of private and public property,
wanton destruction of cities or devastation not justified by military
67. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Komarow, supra note 13, at 30-35 (nations incorporating some or all of
the Nuremberg Principles into their domestic law include the Soviet Union, Hungary, and
Israel).
71. See Jackson, supra note 22 at 169-71.
72. Appraisal, supra note 4, at 62.
73. Id. at 79; see Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV.
396, 407-08 (1946).
74. Snee, supra note 13, at 897-98.
75. Id. at 897.
76. Id. at 898.
77. Official Documents, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 89, 95 (1907).
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necessity. 78
The Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 192879 is another source of the origins
of the Nuremberg Principles. 80 The signatory nations, sixty-three in
number including the United States, Germany, Italy, and Japan, de-
clared "that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of interna-
tional controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy
in their relations to one another." '81 This commitment set the stage for
the London Agreement and Charter's prohibition against planning or
preparing for aggressive war as a crime against the peace.82
In addition to events preceding World War II, events during and
after the war relating to the Nuremberg Principles are sufficiently numer-
ous and diverse in time and place to qualify the Principles as customary
international law. These events include the St. James Declaration, 83 the
Moscow Declaration, 84 Control Council Law No. 10,85 the International
Military Tribunal's trial of war criminals at Nuremberg, 86 twelve sepa-
rate war crimes trials conducted unilaterally by the United States at Nu-
remberg,8 7 similar trials in the Pacific theater,88 and numerous trials
conducted by other nations.89
Events subsequent to World War II also undermine the criticism
that the Nuremberg Principles fail to achieve the status of customary
international law because they stem from a single event. Prominent
among these events are proceedings of the United Nations related to the
Nuremberg Principles. The proceedings began in 1946 and continued for
78. See Campbell, supra note 32, at 102.
79. Kellogg-Briand Treaty: Renunciation of War as a National Policy, August 27, 1928,
art. I, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
80. Agreements, supra note 4, at 84.
81. Kellogg-Briand Treaty, 46 Stat. at 2345-46.
82. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
83. The St. James Declaration resulted from a conference initiated by the Inter-Allied
Commission on the Punishment of War Crimes. Signatories to the declaration, executed on
January 13, 1942, included representatives of governments in exile from Belgium, France,
Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Representatives of
England, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States and the
Soviet Union attended the conference. See HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 90-94 (1948) [hereinafter His-
TORY]; Agreements, supra note 4, at 84-85.
84. HISTORY, supra note 83, at 107-08; Agreements, supra note 4, at 85-86.
85. Subsequent to the International Military Tribunal's trial of war criminals at Nurem-
berg, the Control Council for Germany, consisting of the military commanders of the four
occupied zones of Germany, enacted Control Council Law No. 10 on December 20, 1945.
Under the law, tribunals were set up by the occupying powers in each zone to try the remain-
ing war criminals. See Agreements, supra note 4, at 89-91.
86. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).
87. Agreements, supra note 4, at 91.
88. See THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 24, at 1029-1183.
89. Id.; Agreements, supra note 4, at 89-9 1.
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more than three decades following the war.90 Finally, as discussed be-
low,91 the Nuremberg Principles, proffered in defense of political protes-
ters, recently have been allowed by several domestic courts in the United
States. In light of these events spanning more than a century, the criti-
cism that the Nuremberg Principles are not part of customary interna-
tional law because they stem from a "single event" cannot be seriously
maintained.92
The second argument presented against the Nuremberg Principles'
status as customary international law relates to the three basic interna-
tional crimes that the Principles establish: war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, and crimes against the peace. 93 Commentators separate these
three crimes. 94 They maintain that "there is no dispute that [traditional
war crimes] are part of customary and treaty international law,"' 95 but
they question whether crimes against the peace and crimes against hu-
manity are included in such law. 96 In support of the view that only war
crimes are part of customary international law, commentators have ar-
gued that most of the Nuremberg defendants who received death
sentences were convicted of war crimes' along with crimes against the
peace and crimes against humanity, and that those convicted solely of
crimes against the peace were not executed. 97
This argument is misleading and unsound. The severity of the pun-
ishment imposed pursuant to a particular rule of law is not a yardstick
for measuring that law's status as customary international law. This ar-
gument also fails on its merits: not one of the twenty-two defendants
tried before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was con-
victed solely on a count of crimes against the peace.98 The Rudolf Hess
case comes closest to the critics' scenario. Hess was convicted on counts
of crimes against the peace and conspiracy to commit crimes against the
peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes99 and received a life sen-
tence. Of the sixteen defendants charged with crimes against the peace,
twelve were convicted. Of those twelve, seven were sentenced to hang,
three received life sentences, one received a prison term of fifteen years
and another a term of ten years.1°° The twelve Nuremberg defendants
sentenced to death were convicted on twelve counts of crimes against
90. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 202-62 and accompanying text.
92. Snee, supra note 13, at 898.
93. Id.
94. See id.; D'Amato, Gould & Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The Nuremberg De-
fense and the Military Service Resister, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1055, 1061-63 (1969).
95. Snee, supra note 13, at 898.
96. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 94, at 1061-63.
97. Id.
98. See Appraisal, supra note 4, at 83.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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humanity, eleven counts of war crimes, seven counts. of crimes against
the peace and five counts of conspiracy to commit crimes against the
peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes.10 Defendant Julius
Streicher, who was sentenced to death and executed, was convicted for
only one count of crimes against humanity. I0 2 Thus, this criticism is
unpersuasive.
In summary, the United States is bound by customary international
law, and the Nuremberg Principles are part of that body of law. In addi-
tion to the above arguments, the United States should apply the Princi-
ples in domestic courts because it intended to be bound when the
Principles were promulgated.
(3) The United States Intended to be Bound by the Nuremberg Principles
Attempts by commentators and courts to argue that the Nuremberg
Principles do not apply in the United States courts are inconsistent with
the United States government's position during and after World War II.
Representatives of the United States government, such as President
Harry Truman and Supreme Court Justice Jackson, indicated that the
participants in the Nuremburg Trials, including the United States, in-
tended the Principles to be universally applicable. In his opening state-
ment as chief allied prosecutor in the 1945 Nuremberg War Crimes
Trials, Justice Jackson declared:
[W]hile this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law
includes, and if it is to serve any useful purpose it must condemn, ag-
gression by any other nations, including those who sit here now in
judgment. We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence
and aggression by those in power against the rights of their people only
when we make all people answerable to the law. 03
Justice Jackson acknowledged that if certain acts are crimes, "they are
crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does
them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct
against others which we would be unwilling to have invoked against
US."1104
President Truman praised the Nuremberg Principles in an address
to the United Nations General Assembly, declaring that they point "the
path along which [international] agreement might be sought, with hope
of success."' 05 Acting at President Truman's direction, the United States
delegation introduced a resolution to the General Assembly that
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 154 (1947).
104. E. KNOLL & J. MCFADDEN, WAR CRIMES AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 1
(1970).
105. THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 24, at 1028. The first Secretary General of the United
Nations, Trygve Lie, stated: "In the interests of peace and in order to protect mankind against
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"[a]ffirms the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of
the Nurnberg Tribunal." 10 6  The General Assembly unanimously
adopted the resolution on December 11, 1946.107
The continuing force of the Principles in the United States is demon-
strated not only by this country's leading role in the Nuremberg prosecu-
tions and other war crimes trials, 108 but by further actions demonstrating
this nation's intention to rely on, and be bound by, the Principles in the
future. The United States' intention and expectation to be bound by the
Nuremberg Principles is evident in the incorporation of the principles
into the United States Army Field Manual. That document states that
any person, civilian or military, "who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to pun-
ishment. Such offenses in connection with war comprise: (a) crimes
against peace; (b) crimes against humanity; and (c) war crimes."' 0 9 The
Manual includes as punishable "conspiracy, incitement, attempts, and
complicity" in the commission of international crimes."10 Like the Nu-
remberg Principles, the Manual specifically excludes the defense of supe-
rior orders." '
The legal proceedings following the massacre of Vietnamese civil-
ians by United States military forces at My Lai provide additional evi-
dence of the widespread acceptance of domestic application of the
Nuremberg Principles. 1 2 In Calley v. Callaway, 1 3 a federal district
court overturned Lt. William L. Calley, Jr.'s conviction by a military
court for his role in the massacre. The reversal was based in part on a
finding that Calley's constitutional rights of confrontation and the com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor were violated. 114 Cal-
ley had asserted that a number of United States military officials were not
made available as witnesses at his military trial. The district court inti-
mated that the Nuremburg Principles applied to the United States mili-
wars, it will be of decisive significance to have the principles ... [of] the Nuremberg trials...
made a permanent part of the body of international law as quickly as possible." Id.
106. G.A. Res. 95(1) 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
107. Id.
108. See MEIKLEJOHN CIVIL LIBERTIES INSTITUTE PEACE LAW DOCKET: 1945-1988
86-89 (A. Ginger ed. 1988) (available at Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, Berkeley, Califor-
nia) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN].
109. UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 42, § 498.
110. Id. § 500.
111. Id. § 509 ("The fact the law of war has been violated pursuant to an order of a supe-
rior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its character as
a war crime, nor does it constitute a defense in the trial of an accused individual, unless he did
not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was
unlawful.").
112. See generally T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY
(1970) (description of the massacre at My Lai).
113. 382 F. Supp. 650, 712-13 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
114. Id. at 692-708 (discussion of compulsory process and confrontation issue).
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tary personnel when the court concluded that, high ranking military
officials refused to testify because they reasonably feared that they them-
selves would be charged with having committed international crimes. 115
The court noted that "petitioner's superiors, in particular General West-
moreland, stood a very strong possibility that they would come to the
same end that [Japanese General Yamashita] did."'1 16 The reference is to
In re Yamashita, 117 in which a military tribunal sentenced the Japanese
General to death for allowing soldiers under his command to commit
international crimes. Thus, the Calley court assumed that the Nurem-
berg Principles applied to United States military personnel, and con-
cluded that "there was reason to believe [Calley's] superiors had cause
for concern as to their own status."'" 8
While Calley implicated the Nuremberg Principles indirectly, the
Principles have been directly employed in domestic courts many times
since World War II by use of the modern Nuremberg Defense." 9 Hav-
ing discussed what the Nuremberg Principles are and considered gener-
ally how they intersect with domestic law, this Note now examines the
specific manner in which the Nuremberg Principles have been raised in
domestic courts.
II. The Modern Nuremberg Defenses
German government officials, industrialists, and military leaders,
whom the Allies accused of committing international crimes, presented
the "original" Nuremberg Defense. These defendants argued that they
should not be held personally responsible for their actions because they
were not top government officials, they had not formulated policy, they
were following superior orders, and that international law did not apply
to individuals.' 20 This defense was rejected in the war crimes trials fol-
lowing World War 1.121 The modern Nuremberg Defenses are the an-
tithesis of the original defense: criminal defendants today build a defense
based on the reasoning and principles used by the Allied nations to con-
vict Germans at Nuremberg. There are essentially two modern Nurem-
115. Id. at 696.
116. Id. at 696.
117. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1945).
118. Calley, 382 F. Supp. at 696.
119. See United States v. Montgomery, 722 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980);
Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp.
957 (D.P.R. 1968); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968); Farmer v.
Rountree, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.
1958); State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973); Vermont v. McCann, No. 2857-7-
86 (D. Vt. Jan. 26, 1987), reprinted in 44 GUILD PRAC. 101 (1987).
120. THE LAW OF WAR, supra note 24, at 1283.
121. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
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berg Defenses: the Citizen's Duty and the Citizen's Privilege. 22
A. Citizen's Duty
Under the Citizen's Duty defense, defendants assert that they could
be held liable for complicity with international crimes if they fail to take
action to prevent such crimes. Thus, in theory, the Citizen's Duty is
exercised in the defendant's own individual interest. It shields the indi-
vidual from future liability for failing to act to stop the commission of an
international crime.
Under this formulation of the Defense, the defendant cites the Nu-
remberg Principles as creating a "citizen's duty" under international and
domestic law to take action to prevent international crimes when the citi-
zen has knowledge of the crime. This duty is seen as superceding the
citizen's duty to obey domestic laws, such as those prohibiting trespass 123
or destruction of private property. 124
The duty to prevent international crimes supercedes the duty to
obey domestic laws for at least three reasons. First, the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples, as enforced at the war crimes trials following World War II, re-
quire that international law predominate over domestic law when a
conflict exists. 25 The first lesson of those trials was that adherence to
domestic law or superior orders does not insulate one from prosecution
for violations of international law. Second, since the Nuremberg Princi-
ples, as an executive agreement and customary international law, are part
of our federal law, ' 26 the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion requires that the Principles take precedence over state law. 127 Third,
common sense indicates that the prevention of international crimes is
122. The Nuremberg Principles are also sometimes raised in conjunction with the com-
mon law defense of necessity, an examination of which is beyond the scope of this Note. For
three recent discussions of the necessity defense, see Bauer & Eckerstrom, supra note 1; Levi-
tin, supra note 1; Note, Necessity: The Right to Present a Recognized Defense, 21 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 779 (1985-86) (authored by Benjamin Reeve).
123. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602 (Deering 1979) (trespass to private property);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 716.1-.7 (West 1979) (trespass on public or private property); N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1975) (criminal trespass).
124. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594 (Deering 1983) (destruction of private property);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.1 (West 1979) (riot); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.10, 240.6 (McKinney
1975) (destruction of private property and riot).
125. See United States v. Von Leeb, reported in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 462, 489
(1950). The Tribunal stated:
International law operates as a restriction and limitation on the sovereignty of na-
tions. It may also limit the obligation which individuals owe to their states, and
create for them international obligations which are binding upon them to an extent
that they must be carried out even if to do so violates a positive law or directive of
state.
Id.
126. See supra section I(B)(1).
127. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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more important than avoiding misdemeanors such as trespass and disor-
derly conduct.
Courts, commentators, and common sense suggest that ordinary
private citizens have little reason to fear prosecution for failing to act to
prevent international crime.1 28 Proponents of this view argue that citi-
zens have been prosecuted only for positively contributing to interna-
tional crimes, never for failing to prevent such crimes. 129 Realistically, it
seems unlikely that private citizens would ever be held culpable for the
international crimes of their nation. If and when war crimes trials take
place against United States defendants, for example, surely there will be
higher prosecutorial priorities than the private citizen who neither played
a part in policy formation nor in its execution. This practical concern
has led some courts to conclude that the defendants who asserted the
Nuremburg Defense lacked a personal stake in the litigation, and there-
fore lack standing to assert the defense.130
Still, some peace activists find the notion of a citizen's duty morally
compelling. Certainly, as outlined above, the Principles have been inter-
preted to include such a duty.13 1 It follows that the drafters of the Prin-
ciples may have intended such a duty, at least to some extent. 132 This
moral compulsion is reflected in the general perception that ordinary
German citizens who had knowledge of their government's crimes, and
who nevertheless remained silent and inactive in opposition, share some
degree of culpability for those crimes. Pastor Niemoeller wrote:
In Germany they came first for the Jews and I did not speak out, be-
cause I was not a Jew. Then they came for the communists and I did
not speak out, because I was not a communist. Then they came for the
trade unionists and I did not speak out, because I was not a trade
unionist. Then they came for me, and there was no one left to speak
128. See Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Valen-
tine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 986-87 (D.P.R. 1968); State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 473, 509 P.2d
1095, 1109-10 (1973); Snee, supra note 13, at 903-04.
129. While private citizens were tried at Nuremburg, these citizens were industrialists
whose products contributed to the war effort. See The Zyklon B Case, reprinted in THE LAW
OF WAR, supra note 24, at 1487, 1496-98.
130. See United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. May,
622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 341 (D. Md.
1968). The issue of standing is discussed infra at section III(B).
131. Recall that the International Military Tribunal held that "the essence of the [London]
Charter is that individuals have international duties that transcend national obligations of obe-
dience imposed by the individual state." The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal stated that "anyone with knowledge of illegal activity
and an opportunity to do something about it is a potential criminal under international law
unless the person takes affirmative measures to prevent the commission of the crimes." THE
LAW OF WAR, supra note 24, at 1283.
132. See Jackson, supra note 22, at 171 ("We have taken an important step forward in this
instrument in fixing individual responsibility of war-mongering, among whatever peoples as an
international crime.").
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out for me. 133
The Nuremberg Trials put the world on notice that individuals may
have a duty to prevent the commission of, and complicity in, interna-
tional crimes. In contrast to this duty, however, the Nuremberg Princi-
ples also may be viewed as creating a Citizen's Privilege to prevent
international crimes.
B. Citizen's Privilege
Under the Citizen's Privilege formulation of the Defense, the Nu-
remberg Principles are joined with the statutory 134 and common law 135
privileges allowing citizens to prevent crime. This then creates a "citi-
zen's privilege" to break domestic law.
As with the Citizens' Duty outlined above, the Citizen's Privilege is
exercised by the individual acting to prevent the commission of an inter-
national crime as defined by the Nuremberg Principles. Here, however,
the defendant does not seek insulation from future liability. Instead, the
defendant asserts a statutory or common law privilege to violate domes-
tic law in order to prevent commission of international crimes.
Professors LaFave and Scott, summarizing the common law privi-
lege to prevent crime, note that "One who reasonably believes that fel-
ony, or a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace, is being
committed, or is about to be committed, in his presence may use reason-
able force to terminate or prevent it."' 136 Professors Perkins and Boyce
articulate the privilege as follows: "[A]ny unoffending person may inter-
vene for the purpose of pr.eventing the commission or consummation of
any crime if he does so without resorting to measures which are excessive
under all the facts of the particular case."' 137 Most jurisdictions in the
United States recognize this privilege to intervene or use force to prevent
crime. 138 The trend is toward increasing the scope of the privilege. 139
Thus, under the Citizen's Privilege formulation of the defense, the
defendant need only have a reasonable belief that an ongoing or immi-
nent violation of international law is occurring. 14° The defendant need
not prove, nor must the fact-finder conclude, that international law is
actually being violated.
133. J. BARTLETr, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 824 (15th ed. 1980).
134. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692-94 (Deering 1985) (crime prevention privilege
generally).
135. See LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 474-75 (footnote omitted).
136. Id.
137. PERKINS, supra note 9, at 1108-09.
138. See LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 474 n.33; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692-94 (crime
prevention privilege generally), § 197 (privilege to take human life) (Deering 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 704.1-.9 (West 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.00-.25 (McKinney 1987).
139. See PERKINS, supra note 9, at 1111.
140. Campbell, supra note 32, at 97.
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Until recently, defendants' attempts to assert the Nuremberg De-
fense have met with near unanimous rejection in domestic courts. This
Note now examines the justifications domestic courts have used to pre-
vent defendants from presenting both the Citizens' Duty and the Citi-
zens' Privilege formulations of the Nuremberg Defense.
1111. How Domestic Courts Have Handled the Modern
Nuremberg Defenses
United States courts have largely based their rejection of the Nu-
remberg Defenses on the doctrines of political question and standing.
These doctrines prevent the criminal defendant from presenting any evi-
dence of the Nuremberg Defenses to the jury, and the courts often use
both rationales to justify disallowing the Defense. Upon closer scrutiny,
however, the doctrines do not provide an adequate justification for elimi-
nating the use of the Nuremberg Defenses in domestic courts.
Recently, the government also has begun using motions in limine to
prevent the defendant's use of the Nuremberg Defenses. In this context,
such motions raise serious constitutional issues that the courts have not
yet addressed.
A. Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine, which embodies a mixture of separa-
tion of powers principles and prudential considerations, is employed by
courts to avoid deciding an issue. 141 The leading case on the political
question doctrine is Baker v. Carr, in which the Supreme Court corrected
the misconception that all questions involving foreign policy are political
questions. 142 "[lit is error to suppose that every case or controversy
141. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
142. Id. at 211 (holding that the constitutionality of legislative apportionment is not a
political question). Some have claimed that executive and legislative decisions regarding for-
eign policy are per se political questions, and thus such issues are immune from judicial review.
See, eg., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (ques-
tion of whether the president has power to terminate a treaty is nonjusticiable); United States
v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Mass. 1968) ("[A] domestic tribunal is entirely unfit to
adjudicate the question whether there has been a violation of international law during a war
... ."); Egnal v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 255, 259 (1975) (It is "highly doubtful that the legality
or constitutionality of the Vietnam War is within the scope of judicial competence."); Snee,
supra note 13, at 903.
One concern courts have identified is the need for finality and unity in the federal govern-
ment's articulation of foreign policy. The court's comments in Farmer v. Rountree, 149 F.
Supp. 327, 329 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'dper curiam, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958), typify this
concern:
If the judiciary should assume the power contended for [i.e. reviewing the legality of
United States foreign policy], thus in effect reversing and condemning the considered
judgment of the President and the Congress, the foreign and military policies of the
Federal Government could have no real finality until approved by the courts at the
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which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our
cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the
particular question posed .... ,143
The Court took pains to note that the doctrine is one of political
questions, not political cases: "The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a
bona fide controversy involving a claim that some action denominated
'political' exceeds constitutional authority." 144 Then the Court listed six
factors to consider in determining whether a case presents a political
question:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of de-
ciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co-
ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question.145
None of the Baker factors, however, justifies prohibiting a criminal
defendant from presenting the Nuremberg Defenses. Initial policy deci-
sions are not a prerequisite to allowing the Defense because courts have
well developed standards governing the admissibility of evidence. No
disrespect is shown coordinate branches because the Defense does not
require adjudication of the legality of the underlying governmental pol-
icy. No unusual need exists for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision, as the political branches have not barred the Defense. Finally,
the defense does not create a risk of multiple pronouncements because no
judicial pronouncement of foreign policy need result from a trial in
which the Defense was allowed.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Baker, touched on what may be
the true test employed by some domestic courts in disallowing the Nu-
remberg Defenses under the political question doctrine:
conclusion of interminable private litigation. The chaotic and disruptive effects of
such judicial censorship are so obvious that to comment upon them is unnecessary.
This view is problematic because it places those who formulate foreign policy above the
law, and strips the judiciary of its essential function of interpreting the Constitution. In Pow-
ell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, noted
that "[o]ur system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Consti-
tution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.
The alleged conflict that such adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their
constitutional responsibility." Id. at 549. In so stating, Chief Justice Warren recalled the
central lesson of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 C anch) 137, 176-77 (1803), that the judiciary
is the final arbiter of the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts.
143. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 217.
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The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.
Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment,
in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by absten-
tion from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements. 146
Justice Frankfurter's comment raises a question as to which action
will better sustain public confidence in the judiciary: allowing the ac-
cused to present the Defense to the jury, or prohibiting the Defense.
When a defendant is tried for protesting against government policy, 147 it
may be argued that barring the Defense is the more political act. For in
prohibiting the Defense, the judge-a government officer-impedes the
flow of information from the defendant to the jury, which has the effect
of censoring the defendant's criticism of the government. This appear-
ance of quashing political dissent may, in the long run, constitute the
greater threat to judicial legitimacy and authority by undermining the
public perception of courts as detached and neutral.
Related to this concern for legitimacy is a judicial desire to avoid
controversial subjects.'14  Although this is not one of the Baker factors,
perhaps it should have been. According to one commentator, the polit-
ical question doctrine
applies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be
of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction.
Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the
vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might
entail. 149
Concern that allowing the Nuremberg Defense will require adjudi-
cation of the legality of United States foreign policy' 50 may explain why
some courts have barred defendants from asserting the Nuremberg De-
fense. This view reflects a lack of understanding of what is actually
146. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
147. The vast majority of cases in which the Nuremberg Defense has been raised involve a
protest against government policy or actions. See infra notes 202-62 and accompanying text.
While many protests are carried out against private corporations or institutions, these fre-
quently are linked to an underlying government policy. For example, the defendants in State
v. McCann, 149 Vt. 147, 541 A.2d 75 (1987), were arrested at a General Electric plant, but
were protesting the government's policy of sending weapons made by G.E. to El Salvador's
military. For a discussion of Vermont v. McCann, see infra note 202-13 and accompanying
text.
148. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 343 (1924).
149. Id.
150. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 909
(1970), involved a protest against the Vietnam War in which the defendants were accused of
breaking into a Selective Service office and destroying draft files by pouring blood on them.
The court cited the political question doctrine in part as grounds for not allowing the defend-
ants to present the Nuremberg Defense. Id. at 342-43. One commentator shared the court's
mistaken belief that in order to "resolve the question of the validity of this defense, the court
would have had to make an initial finding that the Vietnam War was in violation of interna-
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meant by "allowing" the Defense. Allowing the Defense does not re-
quire the court to adjudicate the legality of foreign policy. Rather, it
simply means letting the defendants present evidence, and instruct the
jury, on the Nuremberg Defense.
Allowing the Defense means recognizing that the jury, acting in its
constitutionally mandated role as the conscience of the community,
should decide whether, in light of all the relevant facts and law, the de-
fendants are guilty of committing a crime. Thus, without actually find-
ing a violation of international law, a jury could find the defendants' acts
were lawful under a crime prevention privilege because they reasonably
believed an ongoing violation of international law was occurring. This is
tional law. This was precisely the political question the court refused to answer." Snee, supra
note 13, at 903 (footnote omitted).
The defendants in United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968), argued
that since the Vietnam War violated international law, they could be held individually respon-
sible should they submit to the draft. The court refused to allow the defendants to present the
Nuremberg Defense in part because of the political question doctrine. Id. at 984-87.
United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1968), also involved a defendant who
refused induction. The court invoked the political question doctrine to avoid consideration of
the Nuremberg Defense, Id. at 517, suggesting "that a domestic tribunal is entirely unfit to
adjudicate the question whether there has been a violation of international law during a war by
the very nation which created, manned, and compensated the tribunal seized of the case." Id.
at 517.
The defendant in Farmer v. Rountree, 149 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd per
curiam, 252 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1958), withheld payment of federal income taxes based on a
belief that the Korean War violated international law. The court refused to hear the Nurem-
berg Defense for several reasons, one of which was the political question doctrine. Id. at 329.
The Farmer holding has been followed consistently in the tax resistance context. See, e.g., Lull
v. Commissioner, 602 F.2d 1167 (4th Cir. 1979) (taxpayer's disagreement with the policies of
the government, because they may not be in accord with the dictates of his conscience or
religion, do not justify refusal to comply with law or refusal to pay income taxes); First v.
Commissioner, 547 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1976) (taxpayer could not successfully defend against
deficiency assessment on grounds that he was morally opposed to war in general, and that
American involvement in Vietnam constituted an illegal war under the Treaty of London and
the Nuremberg Principles); United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.) (taxpayer's
good faith belief in the immorality and illegality of the Vietnam War is not a legal defense to
the charge that taxpayer, to protest the war, withheld his income tax), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
970 (1973); Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969) (the fact that the taxpayer
objected, on religious grounds, to the payment of taxes for war purposes was a basis upon
which he could assert a constitutional right not to pay part of his taxes), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1036 (1970); Russell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 942 (1973) (taxpayer had no constitutional
right to refuse to pay income taxes because the conduct of the United States in Southeast Asia
was contrary to her religious convictions, or because of her belief that such conduct violated
international law); Muste v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913 (1961) (petitioner cannot claim, as a
defense for failing to pay his taxes, that use of the money in part for war purposes was contrary
to the dictates of his conscience and religion).
The Nuremberg Defense was also unsuccessfully argued in United States v. Patz, 584
F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction on other grounds, and
expressly refrained from commenting on the Nuremberg Defense. Id. at 931.
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precisely what happened in Vermont v. McCann.'51 The McCann court
did not find that the policy in question was illegal. Rather, it simply
permitted the defendants to present the Nuremberg Defenses to the jury,
allowing the jury to find that the defendants had legal authority to
trespass. 152
The McCann court did, however, distinguish between choosing
among competing lawful foreign policies (a political question), and find-
ing a policy option illegal (a judicial question). 153 It reasoned that the
choice among legal options is a political decision in which the judiciary
plays no role. The McCann court, however, viewed the legality of a par-
ticular foreign policy as appropriate for judicial determination. 154
The McCann court's distinction is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Powell v. McCormack. 55 In Powell the Court
justified its conclusion that the issue in that case was not a political ques-
tion, in part, by noting that it did not "involve an initial policy determi-
nation of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 156
In addition to judicial concerns about adjudicating foreign policy,
"fear of the vastness of the consequences" might possibly include con-
cern about fostering vigilantism or anarchy. If we allow citizens to break
local laws because they reasonably believe they are enforcing superior
law, when will it end? Does sanctioning the Nuremberg Defense give
private citizens a green light to take the law into their own hands? If
peaceful protesters may employ the Nuremberg Defense, why not those
who bomb abortion clinics?
The response to these concerns again requires that we recall that
allowing the Nuremberg Defense merely means letting the Defense go to
the jury. It is the jury that will draw the line between acceptable and
unacceptable behavior. Thus, the fear that acquitting peaceful demon-
strators today will lead to acquitting violent demonstrators tomorrow ig-
nores the role juries play in our system of criminal justice: they are
arbiters of common sense. The precise line drawn in individual cases
may vary according with individual juries, leading perhaps to inconsis-
tent results. But by providing criminal defendants with rights to present
a defense 5 7 and to a trial by jury,158 the Constitution and the system of
justice entrusts juries with the responsibility of deciding guilt. The
Supreme Court has stated that "the essential feature of a jury obviously
151. No. 2857-7-86, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Vt. Jan. 26, 1987), reprinted in 44 GUILD PRAC.
101 (1987).
152. Id. at 16, 44 GUILD PRAc. at 110.
153. Id. at 18-19, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 109-10.
154. IM at 19, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 110.
155. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
156. Id. at 498.
157. See infra section III(C).
158. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 3; amend. VI; see Colbert, infra note 177, at 1274.
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lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the com-
mon sense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community partici-
pation and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence." 159
A second response to potential concerns about vigilantism or anar-
chy is that the Nuremberg Defense is based on international, federal, and
state laws that expressly recognize the individual's privilege, to act to
prevent crimes against the peace, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. Those who bomb abortion clinics can claim no such express au-
thorization under the law. This distinction reflects the difference be-
tween a defense of jury nullification, 160 in which the jury is asked to
ignore the law and instead follow its conscience, and a defense based in
law, such as the Nuremberg Defense.
B. Standing
The doctrine of standing stems also from both constitutional and
prudential considerations. The constitutional concern derives from the
"case or controversy" requirement of article III of the United States
Constitution.1 61 As indicated in Allen v. Wright, 1 62 the standing require-
ment has two components: (1) the party must have suffered an actual or
threatened injury; and (2) the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the
opposing party's conduct and "likely to be redressed" by a favorable
decision. 63
The United States Supreme Court has considered the standing doc-
trine primarily, if not entirely, in the context of a plaintiff's standing to
sue. 164 For example, the Court has held that simply being a taxpayer 65
159. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
160. See Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972);
Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71 (1969).
161. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III provides in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of dif-
ferent States;-between Citizens of the same State Claiming Lands under the Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
162. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
163. Id. at 751 ("A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.").
164. See e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. 737; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
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or a citizen1 66 interested in having the government act within the bounds
of the Constitution generally does not afford a party standing to chal-
lenge governmental actions. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that:
standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest ... which is
held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessar-
ily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute
which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution.... This personal stake is what the Court has consistently
held enable a complainant authoritatively to present to a court a com-
plete perspective upon the [case].... Only concrete injury presents the
factual context within which a court, aided by parties who argue
within the context, is capable of making decisions.167 "
Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in these cases, lower do-
mestic courts often have held that criminal defendants lacked standing to
assert the Citizen's Duty formulation of the Nuremberg Defense.168 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employed this reasoning in United States
v. May. 169 In May, a large number of demonstrators assembled outside
the perimeter fence of a naval submarine base to protest the use of the
Trident system, a submarine-based nuclear missile system. The demon-
strators then climbed the fence and entered the base, where they were
arrested by security police. The Ninth Circuit refused to allow the
Nuremburg Defense, stating:
The connection between what the defendants did and their claims that
the Trident system is designed solely for the waging of aggressive war,
and is therefore illegal, is so tenuous as not to give them any basis for.
asserting the defense. They can assert no harm to themselves from the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government that is greater than, or dif-
ferent from, the potential harm that might affect every other person in
the United States.' 70
A federal district court applied similar reasoning in United States v.
Berrigan.17 1 Berrigan involved a protest against United States participa-
tion in the Vietnam War, in which the defendants were accused of break-
(1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972).
165. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
101-02 (1968) (Court examined nexus between plaintiffs' status as taxpayers and claim
presented and concluded that plaintiffs had standing because they alleged government ex-
ceeded a specific limitation on taxing and spending power).
166. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 213.
167. td. at 220.
168. See, eg., United States v. Montgomery, 722 F.2d 733 (1 1th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968); United States v. Berrigan, 283 F.
Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968).
169. 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980).
170. Id at 1009.
171. 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968).
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ing into a Selective Service office and destroying draft files by pouring
blood on them. 72 The court held that the defendants lacked standing to
raise the Nuremberg Defense because "they have not been called to serve
in the armed forces, are not directly affected by our government's actions
in that country [Vietnam], and are not even indirectly affected by the
Selective Service apparatus."' 173
This approach to the question of criminal defendants' standing to
assert the Nuremberg Defenses is subject to criticism in light of the Allen
factors of injury and redressability. 174 First, such an approach ignores
the actual injury suffered by the defendants: criminal prosecution and
the threatened injury of imprisonment, fines, and other punishment that
could result from that prosecution. It also ignores the fact that these
injuries are not shared by the general public, but rather are experienced
by the defendants alone. These injuries are "fairly traceable" to the op-
posing party's conduct- for example, the government's conduct-be-
cause absent that conduct, the defendants would not face prosecution. In
addition, these injuries are "likely to be redressed" by a favorable deci-
sion, that is, dismissal or acquittal. In essence, the courts that have re-
jected the Nuremberg Defense for lack of standing have looked for a
particularized injury to the defendant everywhere but in their own
courtrooms.
The substantive purpose of the standing requirement is to ensure
that a litigant has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."'' 75 It is the very act of
government prosecution that creates a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy for the defendant political protester. This personal stake
is sufficient to satisfy the substantive purposes of the standing
requirement. 176
172. Id. at 338.
173. Id. at 341. See also United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D.P.R. 1968), in
which the defendants argued that United States' participation in the Vietnam War violated
international law and as a result they could be held individually responsible should they submit
to the draft. Again, the court refused to allow the defendants to present the Nuremberg De-
fenses based, inter alia, on a lack of standing. Id. at 984.
174. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
175. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
176. In response, some may argue that political protesters in effect ask to be prosecuted by
intentionally violating the law. Such a response ignores the distinction between the Nurem-
berg Defense and traditional civil disobedience. Protesters raising the Nuremberg Defense
believe their actions do not constitute violations of the law. In contrast, civil disobedience
protesters knowingly violate the law and willingly accept punishment for their acts. See supra
note 1.
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C. Government's Use of the Motion In Limine to Prevent the Nuremberg
Defenses
Since the Vietnam War, government prosecutors have engaged in
the relatively new practice of using motions in limine 177 to exclude entire
defenses, including the Nuremberg Defenses. Developed originally in
civil cases, motions in limine traditionally have been used to exclude spe-
cific items of evidence that are likely to prejudice the jury or increase the
complexity and length of trial.178 Recently, however, prosecutors have
begun seeking pretrial rulings barring entire defenses from being heard
by the jury. 179 To support this use of the motion in limine, the govern-
ment typically argues that the defenses it seeks to exclude are irrelevant,
will confuse the issues, and will waste the court's time. 180
This argument was made in United States v. Aguilar, in which the
government prosecuted religious workers for providing sanctuary to ref-
ugees fleeing persecution in Central America.' 8 1 The government's mo-
tion sought to bar defenses based on freedom of religion, the absence of
criminal intent, the Refugee Act of 1980, international law, and neces-
sity.182 In addition, the government moved to prevent defense witnesses
from "testifying about, alluding to, or presenting any evidence.. . ." on
the following issues or subjects: reference to the unindicted Salvadoran
and Guatemalan co-conspirators as "refugees" or "asylees"; the immo-
rality of the United States Government's Central American policy; possi-
ble violations of international law by the United States; episodes, stories
177. Black's Law Dictionary defines "motion in limine" as a "written motion which is
usually made before or after the beginning of a jury trial for a protective order against prejudi-
cial questions and statements." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (5th ed. 1979).
According to Professor Colbert, the motion in limine also is used to avoid prejudicial
questions or evidence from being heard by a jury and is most commonly made before trial,
although a judge may defer a final, absolute order until the matter actually is raised at trial. In
the latter case, the trial court issues a preliminary order prohibiting either party from referring
to the subject matter in the jury's presence until the court makes its final ruling. Commenta-
tors prefer this 'prohibitive-permissive' order to the 'prohibitive-absolute' in limine ruling be-
cause it allows the judge to rule upon the admissibility of an evidentiary item after he becomes
more familiar with the issues in the case. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive
Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial 39 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1271 n.1 (1987).
178. Id. at 1271.
179. Id at 1272.
180. See Colbert, supra note 177, at 1311 and n.240, citing Memorandum in Response to
Defendants' Motion to Strike the Government's Motion in Limine at 13-15, United States v.
Aguilar No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC (D. Ariz., filed Jan. 10, 1985), appeal docketed, No. 86-
1208 (9th Cir. July 3, 1986).
181. Colbert, supra note 177, at 1309 and n.232, 1310 and n.233. The defendants were
charged with conspiracy to violate immigration laws, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), and with the substan-
tive crime of transporting, concealing, or harboring aliens, and encouraging or inducing aliens
to unlawfully enter or remain in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)-(4).
182. See Colbert, supra note 177, at 1310 and n.235, citing Government's Motion in
Limine at 1-2, Aguilar, No. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC.
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or tales of civil strife in Central America; United States policy regarding
the granting or denial of asylum or refugee status to aliens from Central
America; the impact a guilty verdict would have on the immigration sta-
tus of the unindicted co-conspirators; and the policy of amnesty and ex-
tended voluntary departure for Salvadorans. 183
The court granted the government's motion in limine. 184 The ruling
did not, however, produce the promised results: it did not avoid delay
and judicial involvement, nor did it simplify the issues at trial. As Pro-
fessor Colbert notes, "the pretrial motion practice lasted nine months
and included over 150 motions, applications, and memoranda submitted
by both parties before the court's final in limine ruling . . . ." 15 Thus,
Aguilar suggests that, far from streamlining trials, blanket motions in
limine 186 actually may increase the complexity and length of litigation.
With core defenses at stake, an accused has a strong incentive to wage a
fierce battle to avoid an adverse ruling on an in limine motion. More
importantly, the blanket motion in limine raises constitutional concerns.
Professor Colbert suggests that these motions endanger the criminal de-
fendant's right to a presumption of innocence,187 the privilege against
self-incrimination, 88 the right to remain silent,' 89 the right to trial by
jury, 190 and the right to due process of law. 191
If the court requires a response on the merits to a blanket motion in
limine, the accused is forced to disclose his or her defense strategy prior
to trial. 192 By forcing the defendant to speak, the blanket motion in
limine impinges on the defendant's right to remain silent. Thus, even
when the motion in limine is not granted, Professor Colbert argues it
"provides a unique opportunity for the government to discover and pre-
pare to counter the specific defense or testimony that the defendant will
present at trial. As a result, the government's responsibility and burden
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is diminished"'' 93 since the de-
183. Id. at 2-3.
184. See Colbert, supra note 177, at 1312 and n.250, citing Court Order of Oct. 28, 1985,
Aguilar, no. CR-85-008-PHX-EHC.
185. Colbert, supra note 177, at 1312 (footnote omitted).
186. The phrase "blanket motion(s) in limine" is used hereinafter to denote pretrial mo-
tions to bar entire defenses.
187. The government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. No
burden exists on the defendant, who may rely on the presumption of innocence. See LAFAVE,
supra note 9, § 1.4(a), at 17 n.8.
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
189. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
190. See U.S. CONsT. art III, § 2, cl. 3; amend. VI; Colbert, supra note 177, at 1274.
191. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
192. Criminal defendants generally are not required to disclose intended defenses unless
required to do so by statute. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (notice of alibi), 12.2 (notice of
insanity).
193. Colbert, supra note 177, at 1272.
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fendant is forced to reveal generally undiscoverable material before trial.
The consequences are more serious when the motion in limine is
granted. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights provide for jury trials in
criminal cases because the framers of the Constitution believed that juries
were "necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges .... -194
Juries serve as a vital check on the government's prosecutorial power.
The right to trial by jury has been called "the single greatest guarantor of
constitutional protection of individuals from government misuse of
power.. "195 This function is all the more important when the accused
is being prosecuted for activities related to political dissent. As Professor
Colbert explains:
[T]he judiciary must carefully scrutinize the criminal procedures used
by the government in politically sensitive trials to assure preservation
of constitutional guarantees and respect for citizens' rights. Absent
such judicial control and government accountability to the people
through the jury, the danger exists that the government will run
roughshod over democratic principles in its fervor to quell political
dissent. 196
Thus by eliminating the presentation to the jury of entire defenses by
criminal defendants the blanket motion in limine directly impacts the
right to a jury trial. 197
In addition to threatening the right to jury trial, the blanket motion
in limine also may violate due process because it denies the defendant
"an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court
.... ,"198 The Supreme Court has held that the right to present a defense
is an essential component of due process. 199 In Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 200 the Court held that evidentiary rulings that frustrate a defend-
ant's attempt to develop an exculpatory defense constitute a denial of due
process, requiring reversal in the event of a conviction. 20 1
Barriers that prevent criminal defendants from presenting the Nu-
remberg Defenses pose serious threats to core constitutional values.
Whether these barriers result from government motions in limine, or
from judicially created limitations, such as the political question doctrine
or standing the result is the same: defendants are denied their day in
court. A growing minority of domestic courts seem to agree, and are
permitting defendants to present the Nuremberg Defenses.
194. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
195. Colbert, supra note 177, at 1273.
196. Id. at 1274.
197. Id.
198. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 (1948).
199. See, eg., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S.
95, 98 (1972); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948).
200. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
201. Id. at 294.
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IV. Recent Cases Recognizing the Modern
Nuremberg Defenses
Typically, allowing the Nuremberg Defense is a pretrial procedural
matter. As a result, observers have had few opportunities to learn the
legal reasoning behind recent decisions considering the defense. Cases in
which the courts have allowed the defense without comment are never-
theless instructive, because the defense was permitted and because of
their outcomes. When the defense is permitted, the defendants usually
win; they are either acquitted by a jury or the prosecution drops the
charges.
A. Vermont v. McCann
In Vermont v. McCann,20 2 the defendant McCann was arrested
while protesting weapons production at the General Electric plant in
Burlington, Vermont, and charged with violating a statute that prohib-
ited disorderly conduct.20 3 The plant manufactured air-to-ground can-
non, which the United States government provided to the armed forces
of El Salvador. 20 4 The defendant offered to prove that the weapon was
used in attacks against civilian populations as part of a strategy of erod-
ing the civilian support for the armed opposition, which was fighting to
overthrow the government of El Salvador. The defendant offered several
defenses, one of which was the Nuremberg Principles. 20 5
In deciding to allow the Nuremberg Defense, the court relied on
notions of equal justice, recognizing that the United States government
consistently has demanded that domestic courts apply international
law.20 6 The court stated:
If international law is proper for a court in the District of Columbia to
consider when judging the conduct of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, intellectual honesty and fundamental concepts of justice
mandate that international law is proper for a court in Vermont to
consider ....
The United States has applied treaty and customary international
law with little hesitation when it was deemed appropriate to bring
others to justice ....
This court is not prepared to hold that our law is that of the hypo-
crite nor is it that of the vengeful conqueror. Therefore, this Court
holds that international law including specifically, the Nuremberg
202. No. 2857-7-86 (D. Vt. Jan. 26, 1987), reprinted in 44 GUILD PRAC. 101 (1987). The
presiding judge was Frank G. Mahady, who subsequently was elevated to the Vermont
Supreme Court.
203. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1026(5) (1977).
204. McCann, No. 2857-7-86, slip op. at 1, 44 GUILD PRAc. at 101.
205. Id. at 13, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 107-09.
206. See, e.g., Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 257
n.15 (D.D.C. 1985).
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Principles, is law appropriate to be administered by this Court or any
other court of justice.20 7
Another significant aspect of the McCann opinion is its treatment of
the political question argument. The court noted that an issue is not
transformed into a political question solely because it involves matters of
social policy or public interest.20 8 The court also noted that a lack of
expertise about the substance of a particular issue on the part of judges
and juries did not preclude its adjudication. 20 9
The court recognized that the Nuremberg Defense involved issues of
foreign policy, which were constitutionally delegated to the executive and
legislative branches. 210 The court also noted that a choice between two
competing foreign policies is a political question, and thus not justicia-
ble.21  A prerequisite to this process, however, is that both of the com-
peting foreign policies be legal.21 2 The McCann court concluded: "Here,
the Defendant offers to prove that a particular foreign policy is illegal,
not that it is unwise or even foolish. That is an issue appropriate for the
judiciary. Were it otherwise the executive would be above the law; it is
not, even in matters of national security. '213
B. Vermont v. Keller
Vermont v. Keller 214 involved a sit-in at the Winooski, Vermont of-
fices of Senator Robert T. Stafford. The protesters had been unable to
engage Stafford in a dialogue concerning United States policy in Central
America, and they hoped by their action to persuade him to hold a pub-
lic meeting to discuss the issue. On the third day, forty-four people were
arrested and charged with trespassing under a Vermont criminal
statute.
21 5
207. McCann, No. 2857-7-86, slip op. at 14-15, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 108..
208. Id. at 17, 44 GUILD PRAc. at 109-10. In support of this point, the court cited cases
deciding questions of reapportionment (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); contraception
(Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973));
school desegregation (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); and executive privi-
lege and national security (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
209. McCann, No. 2857-7-86, slip op. at 18, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 109-10. The court cited
cases deciding questions of medical malpractice (Macey v. James, 139 Vt. 270, 427 A.2d 803
(1981)); surveying (Pidgeon v. State Transportation Board, 147 Vt. 578, 522 A.2d 244 (1987));
accident reconstruction (Cross v. Estate of Patch, 123 Vt. 11, 178 A.2d 393 (1962)); the cause
of a certain cancer (Cavanaugh v. Abbott Laboratories, 145 Vt. 516, 496 A.2d 154 (1985)); and
the proper treatment of schizophrenia (In re L.R., 146 Vt. 17, 497 A.2d 753 (1985)).
210. McCann, No. 2857-7-86, slip op. at 18, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 110 (citing U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2; art. I, para. 8); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
211. McCann, No. 2857-7-86, slip op. at 19, 44 GUILD PRAC. at 110.
212. Id..
213. Id.
214. Vermont v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84 (D. Vt., filed Nov. 13, 1984).
215. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3702(a) (1977). The statute provided: "A person shall
be imprisoned for not more than three months or fined not more than $500.00 if, without legal
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The defendants, known as the "Winooski 44," argued that the
United States government had aided and abetted the government of El
Salvador in the commission of international crimes; that United States
foreign policy with respect to Nicaragua violated international law; and
that the defendants had both a citizen's privilege and a citizen's duty to
take necessary actions to prevent the commission of further international
crimes. 216
The court, which also had decided McCann, allowed the defendants
to present evidence on the Nuremberg Defense to the jury. The jury
acquitted all twenty-six remaining defendants. 217
The case received national news media attention, virtually all of
which focused on the necessity defense rather than the Nuremberg De-
fenses, even though the Defenses constituted an essential component of
the defendants' case. The New York Times, for example, failed to men-
tion issues of international law, justifying the defendants' protest by as-
serting that "the depth and nature of the United States involvement in
Central America made protest a moral necessity. ' 21 8
C. United States v. Thomas
The five defendants in United States v. Thomas 219 had occupied
Congressmember Don Young's office, protesting a bill granting $100 mil-
lion in aid to the Nicaraguan Contras.220 They were charged with dis-
rupting the performance of official duties by government employees. 221
The defendants invoked the Nuremberg Defense, among others. At
the trial, the court allowed the defendants to present evidence on the
Defense, with the exception of two expert witnesses proffered by the de-
authority or the consent of the person in lawful possession, he enters or remains on any land or
in any place as to which notice against trespass is given ...." (emphasis added).
216. Memorandum of International Law for Defendants at 1, Vermont v. Keller, No.
1372-4-84 (D. Vt., filed Nov. 13, 1984).
217. N.Y Times, Nov. 18, 1984, at 15, col. 6. The jury's reason for acquitting the defend-
ants is unclear. Although potentially interesting, it is irrelevant to this discussion. Keller is
significant because the defendants were allowed to present evidence on the Nuremberg Princi-
ples to the jury, and the judge instructed the jury on the Nuremberg Defense.
218. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1984, at 15, col. 6.
219. United States v. Thomas, No. A86-034 (D. Alaska July 16, 1986).
220. See Defendants' Trial Brief at 3, Thomas, No. A86-034 [hereinafter Thomas Defend-
ants' Trial Brief]; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 111, at 6. The aid package was added as an
amendment to the Military Construction Appropriations Bill, which the House of Representa-
tives passed on June 25, 1986. Id. at 6.
221. See 41 C.F.R. § 101.20.305 (1978). The regulation provided in pertinent part:
Any unwarranted loitering, disorderly conduct, or other conduct on property which
creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance; which unreasonably obstructs the usual
use of entrances, foyers, lobbies, corridors, offices, elevators, stairways or parking
lots; which otherwise impedes or disrupts the performance of official duties by Gov-
ernment employees; or which prevents the general public from obtaining the admin-
istrative services provided on the property in a timely manner, is prohibited.
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fendants.2 22 The court held that the defendants' conduct was not pro-
tected by the Defense, and convicted all defendants. 223
Though willing to hear the Nuremberg Defense, the opinion sug-
gests that the court either ignored or misunderstood the Defense. The
court wrote that "the defendants have not provided this court with any
persuasive legal authority to sanction their conduct because of their belief
in moral and legal responsibilities as citizens of the United States to pre-
vent their government from engaging in war crimes or crimes against
humanity." 224
The court appeared to give little weight to the defendants' trial brief,
which set out in detail individual responsibility under international law,
the relationship between domestic and international law, specific viola-
tions of international law by the United States, and the defendant's rea-
sonable belief about those violations.225 Even though the court was
unpersuaded by the defendants' presentation of the Nuremberg Defense,
Id.
222. Karen Parker was to testify on the international legal implications of United States
policy in Nicaragua and the corresponding domestic rights of concerned individuals. Dr. Ed
Meyer, Jr., was to testify regarding his observations of the impact of United States policy on
the civilian population of Nicaragua. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 108, at 8 (letter from James A.
Bamberger, defense counsel in United States v. Thomas to Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute
(Oct. 22, 1986)).
223. Thomas, No. A86-034, slip op. at 9-10.
224. Id. at 10.
225. Thomas Defendants' Trial Brief at 4-9, 19-39. For example, the defendants' brief
noted that in May 1984, in direct response to the mining of Nicaragua's harbors by the United
States Central Intelligence Agency, Nicaragua petitioned the International Court of Justice
(World Court) for an order granting preliminary injunctive relief and damages against the
United States. President Ronald Reagan informed the World Court that the United States
would not recognize the court's jurisdiction in actions brought by Nicaragua against the
United States. The United States briefed and argued the Court's lack of jurisdiction; on May
10, 1984 the Court rejected the United States position by a vote of 14-1. It then entered a
provisional order against the United States as follows:
The right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed by the Republic of
Nicaragua, like any other State of the region or of the world, should be fully
respected and should not in any way be jeopardized by any military and paramilitary
activities which are prohibited by the principles of international law, in particular the
principles that States should refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State,
and the principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of a State, principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and the
Charter of the Organization of American States.
Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 169.
Upon the World Court's finding that it had jurisdiction, the United States announced on
January 18, 1985, that it would not participate in the proceeding and would not be bound by
any judgment of the Court. For purposes of this discussion, Nicaragua's suit against the
United States is interesting for two reasons. First, as noted, the Thomas defendants relied
upon the suit as evidence of the reasonableness of their belief that the United States policy
toward Nicaragua violated international law. Second, the case evinces the United States gov-
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the case is significant because the court permitted the introduction of
evidence, and thereby legitimized, the Defense.
D. Chicago v. Streeter
The eight defendants 226 in Chicago v. Streeter 227 had been demon-
strating at the Chicago office of the South African Consulate, and were
arrested and charged with trespassing228 . The defendants raised the Nu-
remberg Defense and the necessity defense. The court permitted the de-
fenses to go to the jury. The jury acquitted all the defendants. 229
E. Washington v. Karon
The four defendants in Washington v. Karon 230 were arrested while
blockading the United States government plutonium/uranium extraction
facility at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, a facility which produces
most of the plutonium used in United States nuclear weapons. They
were charged with disorderly conduct 231 and failure to disperse. 232
The defendants filed a motion to raise the Nuremberg Defense,
among others. 233 At the hearings on the defendants' motion, the judge
indicated he would instruct the jury on international law. 234 In his open-
ing statement, defense counsel was allowed to explain in depth the de-
fendants' beliefs that international law gave them a right to act as they
did.235 Defendant Scott Renfro, the first defense witness, covered the
ernment's practice of denying the legitimacy of international law when it perceives that body
of law as inimical to its short-term interests. Thomas Defendants' Trial Brief, at 20-21.
Note that this is the same World Court to which the United States turned in 1980 seeking
redress for the taking of American hostages in Iran. Ironically, the last country to withdraw
from proceedings in the World Court was Iran in 1980 in response to the United States suit.
Thomas Defendants Trial Brief at 21 n. 11.
226. The defendants were: Allan Streeter, a Chicago City Alderman; Jane Ramsey, Execu-
tive Director of the Jewish Council on Urban Affairs; Ralph Henley, Pastor; Stephen Culen,
Director of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO;
Orlando Redekipp, Pastor; Thomas Savage, Metropolitan Sanitation District; Heather Booth,
Organizational Consultant to Citizen Action; and Edward Palmer, President of the Black
Press Institute. N.Y Times, May 18, 1985, at 4, col. 4.
227. Chicago v. Streeter, No. 85-108644 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill., May, 17, 1985).
228. See CITY OF CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 193-1.4 (1972) (unlawful trespass).
229. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1985, at 4, col. 4.
230. Washington v. Karon, No. J85-11-36 (D. Wash., Dec. 10, 1985).
231. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.84.030(1) (1984). The statute provided that a person is
guilty of disorderly conduct if she "intentionally obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic with-
out lawful authority."
232. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.84.020 (1984).
233. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Allow Introduction of Evidence
on Necessity and International Law, at 7, Karon, No. J85-11-36.
234. Meiklejohn, supra note 108, at 17 (summary of Washington v. Karon, prepared by
defense counsel Daniel N. Clark (Dec. 21, 1985)) [hereinafter Clark].
235. Id.
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same area in detail, and read quotations from the London Agreement
and Charter.236 The defense then offered its first expert witness, chemist
Allen B. Benson.237 The prosecution objected, and the judge ruled that
scientists could testify for the defense. 238 After consulting with attorneys
from the United Stated Department of Energy,239 the prosecution moved
to dismiss the case. 240 According to defense counsel Daniel N. Clark,
[t]he prosecution motion made under these circumstances created a
sensation in the courtroom. The defendants and their counsel immedi-
ately called a news conference in the corridor in order to present their
expert witnesses to the press, and to put forward the obvious conclu-
sion that the prosecution and the Department of Energy were afraid of
scientific testimony .... 241
F. Illinois v. Jarka242
On November 13, 1984, nineteen persons were arrested at the Great
Lakes Naval Base while protesting United States involvement in Central
America and increases in nuclear arms buildup. The protesters were
charged with mob action and resisting arrest.243 Charges against twelve
of the protesters were dismissed. The remaining defendants in Illinois v.
Jarka entered a defense of necessity based in part on the Nuremberg
Principles.244
The court allowed the defendants to present evidence concerning
illegal United States actions in Nicaragua.245 The defendants argued that
"the principles of international law can only be effective through the seri-
ous adherence to them by peoples of all countries. '246 The jury acquitted
all defendants. 247
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.; Tri-City Herald, Dec. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, Dec. 11,
1985, at 1, col. 5.
241. Clark, supra note 234.
242. Illinois v. Jarka, No. 002170 (Cir. Ct., Ill., Apr. 15, 1985), reprinted in 42 GUILD
PRAC. 108-10 (1985).
243. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Feb. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
244. Id.; Defendants' Memorandum in Response to State's Motion in Limine to Bar Ne-
cessity Defense at 9-10, Jarka, No. 002170.
245. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Feb. 26, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
246. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to State's Motion in Limine to Bar Necessity
Defense at 9, Jarka, No. 002170.
247. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Apr. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 3. See generally Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin, Apr. 30, 1985, at 2, col. I (letter written by four attorneys for the defense criti-
cizing the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin's coverage of the case).
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G. Massachusetts v. Carter248
On November 24, 1986, Amy Carter, Abbie Hoffmanm, and fifty-
eight others were arrested during a protest against recruiting by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the University of Massachusetts, Am-
herst. The demonstrators were charged with disorderly conduct,
trespassing, and disturbing the school.249
The defendants proffered evidence and expert witnesses on the de-
fenses of necessity and international law, including the Nuremberg Prin-
ciples.250  The defendants argued that United States domestic law
expressly incorporated international law, and that considerations of in-
ternational law were crucial to the defendants' ability to defend against
the charges.251 They argued that the executive branch of the United
States government was violating international law through the actions of
the CIA, and that the defendants had a legal obligation under the Nu-
remberg Principles to prevent the CIA from committing further
crimes. 252
The court allowed the jury to hear the defenses. The jury acquitted
all the defendants.2 53
H. City of Richland v. Barnes2 54
On Hiroshima Day, August 6, 1986, twenty-nine people blocked the
road leading to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington. 255 The
248. Massachusetts v. Carter, Cr. No. 8745-JC-0091A, (D. Ct., Hampshire County, Mass.,
Apr. 15, 1987); see also National Law Journal, May 4, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
249. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 108, at 19; N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
250. Defendants' Trial Memorandum at 4, 16, Carter, Cr. No. 8745-JC-0091A.
251. Defendants' Trial Memorandum at 4, 6, Carter, Cr. No. 8745-JC-0091A.
252. Specifically the defendants argued that the executive branch, through the CIA, sets
and conducts secret foreign policy without the knowledge or approval of the American public
or their elected legislators; the covert and illegal operations that constitute this secret foreign
policy are in effect in Nicaragua and have been duplicated in past actions in other countries,
including El Salvador, Chile, the Congo, Indonesia and Vietnam; these operations are ex-
pressly designed to systematically murder, mutilate, and torture civilian populations and to
destabilize governments in those countries; these overt and illegal operations directly contra-
dict public policy and violate numerous national laws, including the Boland Amendment, the
War Powers Act, the Arms Export Control Act and the Neutrality Act; these acts breach
international laws such as the Nuremberg Principles, the Geneva Conventions, the Charter of
the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States; recruitment of
college and university students into the CIA is the lifeline of the agency and provides the
personnel to conduct those covert actions and illegal activities; and finally that under both
international and common law the defendants had either an affirmative duty, or in the alterna-
tive a privilege, to take reasonable steps to stop these crimes. Defendants' Trial Memorandum
at 2-3, Carter, Cr. No. 8745-JC-0091A.
253. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
254. Richland v. Barnes, No. 38323 (D. Wash., Oct. 31, 1986).
255. This demonstration followed one year after the action that led to Washington v.
Karon, see supra text accompanying notes 230-41.
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demonstrators were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.25 6
The defendants' trial brief raised the defense of lawful authority, includ-
ing the Nuremberg Principles, other principles of international law, and
necessity. 25 7
Following the arraignments, the prosecution disqualified the Benton
County District Court Commissioner, who had made the favorable rul-
ings on the admissibility of these defenses in Washington v. Karon. 25 8 At
a hearing on October 31, 1986, Presiding Judge Eugene Pratt dismissed
the charges on his own motion, ruling that the disorderly conduct ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally vague. 259 The statute made it a misde-
meanor to obstruct vehicular traffic "without lawful authority," which
the judge viewed as fatally ambiguous, as demonstrated by the various
claims of lawful authority raised in defendants' brief 2 60
Following the ruling, the judge stated: "I'm not obligated to provide
[the defendants] with a podium to speak from. If they want a trial to
speak from they're going to have to choose a constitutional statute to
violate. '261 Judge Pratt's comments led defense counsel to believe that
"the prospect of hearing evidence and expert testimony on the proposed
defenses motivated the court to seek a way out of a case that was poten-
tially embarrassing to the atomic community. '262
The preceding cases illustrate that thoughtful and objective courts,
seeking justice, have allowed the Nuremberg Defenses. It remains un-
clear to what extent the approach taken in these cases will be followed in
the future. Still, by reexamining the merits of allowing the Nuremberg
Defenses, these cases mark a distinct new jurisprudential path.
Conclusion
The modern Nuremberg Defense provides that private citizens have
a duty or a privilege or both under international law and state crime
prevention statutes to take action to prevent crimes against the peace,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It is proper for courts to per-
mit this Defense under both international and domestic law. The doc-
trines of political question and standing are not legitimate barriers to the
Defense in most cases. Nor is the blanket motion in limine an appropri-
ate vehicle for addressing the issues raised by the Defense. Indeed, con-
256. See Richland Municipal Code § 9.14.010(5) (1976) (disorderly persons are defined as:
"any person who intentionally obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic without lawful
authority").
257. Defendant's Trial Memorandum at 1, 3-27, Richland, No. 38323.
258. See supra notes 230-41.
259. Meiklejohn, supra note 108, at 19 (summary of Richland v. Barnes, prepared by de-
fense counsel Daniel N. Clark (Nov. 20, 1986)) [hereinafter Richland Summary].
260. d
261. Tri-City Herald, Nov. 1, 1986, at Bl, col. 1.
262. See Richland Summary, supra note 259.
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stitutional values, such as due process and the right to trial by jury, are
upheld when courts allow the Defense. Domestic courts have allowed
defendants to assert the Nuremberg Defense to a greater extent than is
currently recognized in the literature.263 When allowed, the Defense has
been effective.264
The inquiry into the contemporary significance of the Nuremberg
Principles aids in the discovery of the "erosion of the criminal boundaries
and the need to restore their claims upon our actions. ' 265 In so doing,
the Principles may provide an important link in a chain of events pro-
moting an end to war. According to Professor Falk, Americans must:
[E]ducate ourselves to the point that we know that waging aggressive
war and committing illegal acts of war are war crimes. We also need
to reorient our sense of citizenship toward the position that it is dis-
loyal for citizens to abet the crimes of their government. As well, we
need to make our governors sensitive to the criminal boundaries that
restrict the exercise of political power. 266
Permitting the Nuremburg Defense upholds the right of United
States citizens to take action to prevent governmental violations of inter-
national law while ensuring that citizen action does not exceed the
bounds of acceptable behavior as drawn by juries, the conscience of our
communities. Disallowing the defense damages judicial legitimacy by ef-
fectively censoring the defendant's criticism of governmental action and
violates the defendant's constitutional rights. At the very least, political
protesters whom the government chooses to criminally prosecute should
have the opportunity to be heard.
263. See supra note 13.
264. See cases cited supra section IV.
265. Falk, The Question of War Crimes: A Statement of Perspective, in CRIMES OF WAR 9
(R. Falk, G. Kolko & R.J. Lifton, eds. 1971).
266. Id. at 8-10.
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